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Property Tax Deferral: Can a Public-Private Partnership Help Provide Lifetime
Income?
Abstract
Many retirees will not have enough money from conventional retirement programs to maintain their
standard of living once they stop working. To help support themselves, they will need to tap their home
equity, the major asset for most middle-income older households. Yet tapping home equity is difficult:
most people are reluctant to downsize and, even when they do, they rarely reduce their housing expenses.
Reverse mortgages are an option, but most households are put off by the enormity of the decision, the
complexity of the product, and the high up-front costs. A statewide property tax deferral program
overcomes the hurdles to accessing home equity. Property tax deferral does not provide access to as
much home equity as a reverse mortgage, but the offsetting advantage is that some of the house value
after the repayment of the loan and interest will be available for a bequest. At the household level, the
proposed program is revenue-neutral: all taxes owed by a participating household are paid back, with
interest sufficient to cover borrowing costs and administrative expenses. But because loans are made
well in advance of repayments, the sponsor of the plan must cover start-up costs. In Massachusetts, if
the state government simply borrowed money to cover the annual outlays, the state’s ratio of debt-to-GSP
would rise from 14.0 percent to 15.1 percent. The alternative is to involve the private sector. This decision
would raise the costs to homeowners, but nevertheless it may be necessary to get a broad-based
program up and running.
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Chapter 12

Property Tax Deferral
Can a Public-Private Partnership Help Provide Lifetime Income?
Alicia H. Munnell, Wenliang Hou, and Abigail N. Walters

In many states, qualified senior homeowners can defer their property taxes for as long as they stay in their home. By reducing taxes upfront, such
programs free up money that can be used for other purposes, providing a stream of income for life that is very similar to having an annuity.
The deferred amounts are repaid with interest when the person sells the
home or dies, so the programs have no long-run cost for states or localities.
Despite these advantages, eligibility is limited and take-up is low. A proposed
redesign of the tax deferral program in Massachusetts would (1) open up
the program by removing income limits; (2) simplify sign-up; and (3) have
the state—rather than the localities—finance the program. This proposal
raises issues both with respect to the potential demand for the option and
with the potential role for a public-private partnership to finance the startup costs when loans far exceed repayments. This chapter provides a case
for property tax deferral, proposes some design elements, estimates potential costs, and calls for additional ideas to explore how such a broad-based
program might work.
In what follows, we first describe the nation’s retirement income challenge and the particular problem for states with high housing costs, using
Massachusetts as an example. Next we describe the major existing programs
for homeowner tax relief in Massachusetts: two that cost the government,
and one that allows low-income homeowners to help themselves through
limited property tax deferral. Our third section describes the proposal for
a new state-wide program of property tax deferral that would be open to
all homeowners. A fourth section addresses likely utilization, including an
assessment of whether people stay in their homes long enough to make
property tax deferral a reasonable option. The fifth section discusses possible roles for the public and private sectors in the financing of such a
program, particularly in covering any shortfalls in the early years. The sixth
section discusses the impact of a property tax deferral on homeowners by
Alicia H. Munnell et al., Property Tax Deferral. In: New Models for Managing Longevity Risk.
Edited by Olivia S. Mitchell, Oxford University Press.
© Pension Research Council (2022). DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192859808.003.0012
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comparing outcomes under such a program with those available through
reverse mortgages. Our final section concludes that a comprehensive property tax deferral program would provide retirees an efficient way to access
their home equity and secure their retirement.

The Retirement Income Challenge
Many retirees are unlikely to have sufficient income to maintain their standard of living once they stop working. The National Retirement Risk Index
(NRRI), which relies on data from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), compares projected replacement rates—benefits
as a percentage of pre-retirement earnings—to target replacement rates
that permit households to enjoy the same consumption before and after
retirement.1 The current NRRI estimate shows that about half of today’s
working-age households are at risk—the risk is larger for the bottom third
of households but it is also substantial for those in the middle and top
of the income distribution range (Figure 12.1). Therefore, the problem is
widespread.
The reasons for this shortfall are twofold: (1) Baby Boomers and generations that follow are going to need more retirement resources; and
(2) traditional sources of retirement income are providing less support than
in the past.

100%

75%

50%

50%

56%

54%
41%

25%

0%

All

Low income

Middle income

High income

Figure 12.1 Percentage of households ‘at risk’ at age 65 by income group, 2016
Note: Households are defined as ‘at risk’ if they are unable to maintain their pre-retirement
standard of living in retirement.
Source: Munnell et al. (2018).
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On the needs side, the drivers are longer life expectancies coupled with
relatively early retirement ages, rising health care costs, and very low interest
rates. These factors combined mean that people are going to need to accumulate substantially more retirement resources now than in the past. On the
income side, social security will provide less relative to pre-retirement earnings because of the rise in the full retirement age from 65 to 67. In addition,
higher Medicare premiums and the taxation of social security benefits for
more households will lower net benefits. Furthermore, the program faces
a 75-year deficit, and additional benefit cuts could be part of a package to
restore balance.
The other major source of retirement income, the private retirement
system, is not working well for much of the population. Due to the lack of
universal coverage, many households end up with no source of retirement
income other than social security. And for those households that do have
a retirement plan, balances are often modest. In 2016, the typical working
household with a 401(k) plan approaching retirement (ages 55–64) had
only $135,000 in combined 401(k)/IRA assets (Munnell and Chen 2017).
That may sound like a lot to some, but it could provide only $600 per month
in retirement income.
However bleak the outlook for the nation as a whole, the situation in
high-property-tax states is more serious. The Gerontology Institute at the
University of Massachusetts-Boston calculates—for each state—the Elder
Economic Insecurity Rate, which is the percentage of single individuals
and couples with income below the level required to cover basic living
expenses. The most recent report shows that, of the ten states with the
highest Elder Economic Insecurity Rate, seven have high levels of property tax (Figure 12.2). The high property taxes mean that high-income states
such as Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey, and California have about the
same percentage of elderly at risk as low-income states such as Mississippi,
Maine, and Louisiana. Policymakers in a number of states have recognized
the problem created by high housing costs and have attempted to provide
some relief.

Existing Provisions for Property Tax
Twenty-four states currently offer some seniors the ability to defer all of
their property taxes until their home is sold or they are deceased.2 Eligibility depends on age, residence, income (in most instances), and (in some
instances) property value. Program parameters are usually set at the state
level, but municipalities generally administer the programs and can often
adjust their eligibility criteria and interest rates. Typically, to be eligible,
homeowners must be age 65 or older and have an annual household income
under $20,000. The typical interest rate charged on property tax deferrals
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Figure 12.2 Percentage of state single population age 65+ below the Elder Index by
property tax level, 2019
Notes: The Elder Index measures the cost of living for older adults by county and state; households that fall below the Index lack sufficient income to meet their basic needs. The property
tax level is for homeowners age 65+.
Sources: US Census Bureau, American Community Survey (2018); and Mutchler et al. (2019).

is about six percent. Yet these key program parameters vary widely across
states and municipalities. In nine states—Arizona, California, Colorado,
Idaho, Illinois, Minnesota, Oregon, Washington, and Wisconsin—the state
finances the program, sending money to the local governments to offset lost
revenue.
Massachusetts provides an example of how states attempt to alleviate the
burden of homeownership for older residents. The state currently has three
programs for property tax relief.3 Two are transfer, or welfare, programs.
The Circuit Breaker Tax Credit, administered at the state level, provides a
credit against the state income tax to taxpayers age 65+ who own or rent residential property in Massachusetts. The credit equals the amount by which
real estate tax payments and half of water and sewer bills exceed 10 percent
of the taxpayer’s income.4 The maximum credit is $1,130. The amount of
the credit is subject to limitations based on the taxpayer’s total income and
the assessed value of the real estate (Table 12.1). This program costs the
state about $80 million per year. The second program is Senior Property Tax
Exemptions, administered at the local level; it provides a $500 exemption on
the property tax bill for those age 70+ who meet specific ownership, residency, income, and asset requirements. Cities and towns which bear the cost of
this exemption can increase the exempt amount to $1,000 and reduce the
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Table 12.1 Massachusetts property tax relief provisions for seniors, 2019
Parameter
Age
Income limit
$90,000 joint
filers
Asset limit

Exemption
Interest rate
Payment due

Provision
Circuit breaker

Exemptions

Deferral

65+
$60,000 single
$75,000 head of
household

70+a
$13,000 single
$15,000 marriedb

65+

$808,000
assessed
property value
Tax credit up to
$1,130
N/A
N/A

$28,000 singled
$30,000 married

None

$500e

Deferral up to 50 percent of
fair cash value f
8 percent
When homeowner sells
property or dies

N/A
N/A

$20,000 single or marriedc

Notes: a Locality may reduce to age 65.
Locality may raise to $20,000 for single or $30,000 for married.
c
Locality may raise to $60,000. Localities may petition the state to raise the level even higher
(above the Circuit Breaker limit for single head of households).
d
Locality may raise up to $40,000 for single and up to $55,000 for married.
e
Locality may raise to $1,000.
f
Homeowners with a mortgage must get permission from their lender to participate in the
program.
Sources: Massachusetts Department of Revenue (2019a); and Massachusetts Acts of 2016 (2016).
b

age to 65. In 2019, cities and towns granted about $10 million in property
tax exemptions
The third program is the Senior Property Tax Deferral program, which
allows local governments to permit some seniors to defer payment of their
property taxes and to recoup those taxes plus interest when the homeowner sells the house or dies. The state sets the program parameters but allows
localities some flexibility. For example, the state’s maximum gross income
for participants is $20,000, but local governments can raise that limit to
$60,000 (the Circuit Breaker limit for a single non-head of household).5
Similarly, the state sets a maximum interest rate of eight percent, but localities can adopt a lower rate. The total value of liens against the property
cannot exceed 50 percent of the assessed market value.6 Once the homeowner sells the home or dies, deferred taxes and accumulated interest must
be paid back within six months, during which time interest accrues at a rate
of 16 percent.7
Figure 12.3 shows that participation in all three programs is limited. In
the case of the Circuit Breaker Tax Credit and the Senior Property Tax
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Figure 12.3 Massachusetts property tax payers age 65+ and participants in senior
tax relief programs, financial year 2019
Notes: Circuit Breaker figure is for financial year 2017 participants. Exemption and deferral
data are for financial year 2019 participants.
Sources: US Census Bureau, American Community Survey (2018); Massachusetts Department
of Revenue (2019b); and Massachusetts Department of Revenue, Division of Local Services
(2019).

Exemptions, participation clearly reflects income restrictions for eligibility.
In the case of the local property tax deferral program, other factors appear
to be at play as well. First, many homeowners are not aware of the program
(since, given the potential financial burden, only wealthy communities tend
to publicize their programs) and many confuse it with other tax credit and
exemption programs. Second, homeowners who are eligible and aware may
not know how to apply for them; are concerned about a stigma attached
to an income-tested program; view the interest rate as too high (especially
during the pay-back period); or hesitate to place a lien on their home. A
new state-wide Property Tax Deferral Program could address many of these
shortcomings.

A Proposal for a New State-wide Property
Tax Deferral Program
The proposed program would not be based on income but rather would be
open to all homeowners in Massachusetts age 65+. Deferrals would be based
on the first $1,000,000 of assessed value on a primary residence; this amount
would be adjusted each year to keep pace with inflation. The rationales
for this approach are fivefold. First, the problem of inadequate retirement
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income is not limited to low-income homeowners; the NRRI shows that
many homeowners in the top and middle thirds of the income distribution also will be at risk in retirement. Second, the program is self-financing:
homeowners repay the deferred property tax with interest when they move
or die. Third, universal eligibility would eliminate any stigma associated with
the program and enhance its acceptability. Fourth, the absence of income
limits simplifies the administration of the program and avoids people being
denied access should they make a large 401(k) withdrawal in a given year.
Finally, history suggests that programs for poor people often turn out to
be poor programs, so universal participation enhances the chances for the
program’s success.
The program would function as follows (see Appendix A for further
details):
• Individuals age 65+ with a primary residence in Massachusetts would be
able to defer their property taxes until the sum of deferrals, accumulated
interest, and mortgages reached 60 percent of the first million dollars of
assessed value.
• Participation in the program would be triggered by simply checking a box
on the city or town’s first-quarter property tax bill (see Appendix B for a
sample tax bill).
• The city or town would continue to have an automatic lien on the home
for the unpaid municipal property taxes; this lien would still be senior to
other liens such as mortgages.8
• When the city or town forwards the tax bill to the state, the state would
send the city or town an amount equal to the deferred taxes.
• The interest rate each year would be set at the state’s borrowing cost plus
a buffer to cover administrative costs and defaults.
• Once notified that the homeowner has moved or died, the city or town
would collect the deferred taxes plus interest upon the sale of the
property and remit this amount to the state.
• The deferred taxes and interest would be due within one year, after which
the interest rate penalty would begin.
This new program would achieve several important goals. First, an average older homeowner in Massachusetts (without a mortgage) would be
able to defer about $5,000 a year in property taxes (see Appendix C). This
amount substantially exceeds the funds provided though the state’s existing tax deferral, exemption, and credit programs, which could be phased
out gradually for homeowners (retaining the Circuit Breaker for renters)
as part of this initiative. The homeowner could choose to defer for a single
year to cover, say, the cost of a new roof, or to defer on an annual basis
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to supplement social security and any other retirement income—although
such flexibility raises some administrative issues.9
Second, property tax deferral would help seniors to age in their own
homes. Survey after survey finds that people strongly prefer to stay in their
own communities (AARP 2014; Age Wave 2015; Hodgson 2022; Chapter 6,
this volume). Moreover, enabling those with dementia to be cared for in
their own home by a combination of family and outside support could
help control future Medicaid costs. Aging in place also allows homeowners to enjoy the benefit of any appreciation in the market value of their
homes. Reducing the costs associated with homeownership would increase
the ability of older homeowners to achieve these outcomes.
Third, the program would alleviate the burden on Massachusetts’ local
governments. Under current provisions, widespread use of a tax deferral
program would have a significant short-term impact on local budgets. The
proposed program removes this burden by having the state advance to cities
and towns the deferral amount and receive the money it is owed when
houses are sold.
In 2019, Massachusetts legislators introduced two significant bills to
enhance the ability of senior homeowners to defer their property taxes. The
first bill—H.3617 ‘An Act relative to senior property tax deferral’—would
immediately improve the existing income-tested program by reducing residency tenure requirements, increasing income eligibility to the level of the
Circuit Breaker Tax Credit, reducing the default interest rate, and delaying
the interest rate penalty to a year after the homeowner’s death (General
Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts 2020). The second bill—
S.1693 ‘A Resolve providing for an investigation and study by a special
commission relative to a senior state property tax deferral program’—
proposed a three-year pilot to test a universal state-run program open to all
households ages 65 and over, modeled after the proposal described above
(General Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts (2020a). Under this
new program, local governments would still administer the program, while
the state would handle the finances. A pilot program would help answer
key questions like what percentage of people are likely to participate, how
much start-up funding is needed, and the program’s effect on the economic security of homeowners. The following sections describe what is known
currently about each of these questions.

Program Participation
The extent to which homeowners participate in a property tax deferral program depends, in part, on the stability of housing patterns: that is, does
it make sense for people to tap their home equity to cover expenses in
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retirement, or will they need the full equity for a subsequent move? Participation also depends on how well the program is publicized and understood
by potential participants, and on the ease of the application process.

The stability of housing patterns
A potential reason for homeowners’ reluctance to borrow against their
houses is the concern that, if they did decide to move, they would have to
pay back the loan with interest and could be left with inadequate resources
at a vulnerable time in their lives.
A recent study examined the stability of homeownership precisely to
assess whether borrowing against home equity is a reasonable option
(Munnell et al. 2020), using data from the 1992–2016 waves of the Health
and Retirement Study (HRS). To describe the typical housing trajectories of
people in their 50s until death required the creation of a synthetic cohort,
‘splicing’ together two cohorts to create a complete picture of late-life
housing trajectories. Sequence analysis was used to group together common residential patterns among homeowners who do move. The analysis
uncovered four groups (Figure 12.4).
The first two groups could be characterized as ‘never movers’ and ‘stable movers.’ Group 1 (53%) includes those who never move from the
original home they owned in their early 50s. Group 2 (17%) moves around
retirement into a new owner-occupied home and then generally stays in
that new home until death. Both of these groups end up with substantially

Never movers (53%)

Stable movers (17%)
Frequent movers (14%)

8
58
–6
2
62
–6
6
66
–7
0
70
–7
4
74
–7
8
78
–8
2
82
–8
6
86
–9
0
90
–9
4

–5
54

50

–5
4

Late movers (16%)

Home 1

Home 2

Home 3+

Rent

LTSS

Deceased

Figure 12.4 Sequence groups for homeowning households in the synthetic cohort,
1992–2016
Source: Munnell et al. (2020).
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more housing wealth than the movers the last time they are observed. The
movers consist of two distinct groups—‘frequent movers’ (Group 3) and
‘late movers’ (Group 4). The ‘frequent movers’ (14%) end up with less combined housing and financial wealth than any other group at the end of the
observation period. The ‘late movers’ (16%) stay in their original homes
until their 80s and then move into either a rental or a long-term services
and support (LTSS) facility, likely due to a health impairment.
The overall conclusion is that most homeowners—the exception being
the ‘frequent movers’—experience enough residential stability to tap home
equity through property tax deferrals. The question then is whether they
would choose to participate.

Participation rates in existing programs
To date, property tax deferral programs appear to be used infrequently. As noted above, one practical hurdle is awareness of their existence:
the programs are generally administered locally and have limited budgets
for outreach.10 In addition, the actual process of applying poses a barrier, as potential participants must often mail or deliver tax returns, deeds,
and birth certificates with application forms. Despite these hurdles, over
10 percent of eligible homeowners in Oregon participated in its property
tax deferral program from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s—a period of rising
property tax rates and high interest rates for consumer loans.11
One could expect participation in an improved Massachusetts program
to exceed that of Oregon, since the property tax burden is substantial,
the program would be well-publicized, and participation would require
homeowners simply to check a box on their tax bills. In that environment,
one would expect that participation would be driven by need. The NRRI,
based on data from the 2016 SCF, predicts that—without using their home
equity—61 percent of homeowners age 55–59 will be at risk in retirement,
compared to just 33 percent of this group if home equity is used. A little over half of these homeowners report a strong bequest motive (34%)
and are probably unlikely to participate in the program. But those with no
bequest motive (11%) may well be willing to defer taxes, and perhaps half
of those with a weak bequest motive (17%) as well. These assumptions yield
the estimate of roughly a 20 percent participation rate with a well-publicized
program.

Financing a State-wide Program
The proposed property tax deferral program would be revenue neutral
at the household level; the state provides the cities and towns the money
up front and recoups the outlay with interest when the home is sold. Two
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Table 12.2 Home value remaining and survival probability at selected ages for a
household starting deferrals at age 65
Age

Home value used plus
interest (%)

Home value remaining
(%)

Survival probability
(%)

95
100
105

37
45
52

63
55
48

29
8
1

Note: The calculations assume no mortgage on the property and use the same assumptions as
the model (see Appendix D).
Source: Authors’ calculations.

buffers in the proposal would reduce risks to the sponsor. First, a surcharge
of 50 basis points could be added to the interest rate to cover administrative
costs. Second, deferrals would be capped to protect the sponsor against a
decline in home value below the amount owed due to a failure to maintain
the home or a more general decline in housing prices.
While stopping deferrals once a homeowner owes more than a set
percentage of the home’s assessed value in deferred taxes, interest, and
mortgage protects the sponsor, it could force some homeowners to start
paying taxes again after years of deferrals. Thus, setting the appropriate cap
involves striking a balance between protecting the sponsor and protecting
homeowners. A cap at 60 percent appears to balance these interests. To
reach this cap, a 65-year-old homeowner without a mortgage could defer
taxes every year for over 40 years—a deferral period that few homeowners
would require (Table 12.2). From the sponsor’s perspective, this cap would
leave at least 40 percent of the first million dollars of home value as a buffer
to ensure that proceeds from selling the house would be sufficient to repay
the deferred taxes plus interest.12 In a similar vein, the cap would limit the
risk to the sponsor of falling property values, as the dollar amount of the
cap would fluctuate with changes in the assessed value.
While a cap and a buffer on the interest rate should protect the sponsor
from losses, the program start-up would involve an extended period when
deferred property tax payments would exceed the amounts recouped from
the sale of houses due to a move or the death of the homeowner. The financial shortfall would need to be covered either by the state or through some
arrangement with the private sector.
To get a sense of the pattern of the shortfall during the start-up and to
understand the factors that could affect its size, consider a world where the
amount of property taxes collected did not increase and the population of
homeowners over 65 remained constant. In this simple model, the amount
required to finance a property tax deferral program would be highest in the
first year of the program, declining each year thereafter as people exited the
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Figure 12.5 Annual net property tax deferral program cost, millions of 2019 dollars,
2020–2050
Source: Authors’ projections of proposed Massachusetts program.

program and paid back the taxes they had deferred. The total outstanding
amount therefore would grow quickly at first before stabilizing as taxes paid
back began to equal new deferrals.
In reality, home prices do increase, the population over age 65 is growing, and interest and administrative expenses accrue each year. So instead
of reaching a steady state, the revolving debt account would grow. The cost
projections presented below take all these factors into account. In addition, the assumption is that the 20 percent of homeowners age 65+ who
are estimated to participate in the program would defer taxes every year
until the last homeowner died. The results of the model show that—with a
five-year phase-in—the program would require about $100 million in new
loans in the first year, with the amount rising to $555 million in 2026 before
declining (see Figure 12.5). The question is how to finance these shortfalls,
particularly during the start-up period.

A public approach
In our view, the most efficient approach would be for the state of Massachusetts to cover the costs through borrowing. That is, when an age 65+
household in Natick, MA, checks the box on its property tax bill indicating
a decision to defer its $5,000 in property taxes, Natick would automatically have a lien against the home for the deferred taxes. Natick would notify
the state and the state would then forward $5,000 to Natick. The state would
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then need some way to cover the $5,000 expenditure and associated interest
costs in its budget.
Since general obligation bonds are typically utilized only for capital
expenditures, and the terms of the bonds are typically tied to the projects
that are being funded, the most logical vehicle would be debt based on
anticipated revenues. This approach could involve Revenue Anticipation
Notes (RANs) or Tax Anticipation Notes (TANs), which are general obligations of the state but are repaid with the revenues or taxes collected at
some point in the future. Traditionally, these notes are shorter term obligations (almost like commercial paper), typically repaid within the same fiscal
year. But experts suggest that the proposed legislation could extend that
term. For example, in the early 1990s, the state issued a seven-year general
obligation debt to fund the deficit, in anticipation of revenues to be collected in the future. Regardless of the specific approach taken, homeowners
would only be charged the low interest rate that states would have paid on
the debt, which would have been exempt from federal and state personal
income tax.
The bond deal would be much easier to structure if interest were paid to
the bond holders each year. One option is for the state to front the interest
out of its budget each year and get repaid when the property is sold. Some
experts are skeptical, however, as to whether the state would be willing to
take on this responsibility—even though the interest would amount to only a
tiny fraction of the budget. A second option is for the homeowner to pay the
interest and administrative surcharge each year instead of including these
costs in the deferred amount. While the latter approach would simplify the
bond deal and substantially reduce borrowing amounts, it would also complicate the program and perhaps dissuade homeowners from participating.
Of course, the alternative is not to pay the interest each year but rather to
issue zero-coupon bonds, which is a way to finance the interest through borrowing. But zero-coupon bonds are more expensive and rarely used by state
governments. In any event, financing the accruing interest would need to
be addressed.
For calculating the cost of the program, we have assumed that the interest on the deferred taxes is financed by borrowing. The borrowed amounts
would add to Massachusetts’ outstanding debt, which currently equals about
14 percent of gross state product (GSP). At its peak, program borrowing
would increase Massachusetts’ debt outstanding from 14 percent to 15.1
percent of GSP (Figure 12.6).13 Thereafter, the program’s impact would
decline steadily. The key question for the state is whether the additional borrowing would affect its credit rating. One would think that since
the deferred taxes are secured by liens on the properties, rating agencies would conclude that the financial strength of the state had not been
compromised.
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Figure 12.6 Massachusetts debt relative to gross state product with and without the
program, assuming 20 percent participation rate, 2020–2100
Sources: Commonwealth of Massachusetts (2002–2019); Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
(2018); and authors’ projections.

In the end, the state must decide if it is willing to take on the financing
of a broad-based property tax deferral program. If the state is reluctant to
do so, the obvious question is whether private sources of funding would be
available.

Relying on the private sector
It is possible that a private-sector company might be interested in funding a
property tax deferral program, providing it generated a meaningful volume
of transactions. One approach might involve a private financial intermediary working directly with cities and towns. That is, when a 65-year-old Natick
homeowner checks the box that he or she would like to defer $5,000 of property taxes, the private company would give the town of Natick $5,000 and
then take an assignment of the deferred tax amounts and the related lien on
the homeowner’s house. The company would repeat this process with other Massachusetts cities and towns. The attractiveness of such a proposition
would depend in the first instance on the interest rate the company could
charge the homeowner. But even with an interest rate noticeably above that
charged by the state, the company might have to wait 30 years or more to
get back its $5,000 plus interest. To get an immediate payment, the company could potentially package together a batch of these loans, securitize
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them, and sell the securitization instruments on the open market. The success of such transactions depends on how receptive investors are to the new
security.
The costs of a private company dealing with 300+ cities and towns in Massachusetts at a local level could be prohibitively expensive. Alternatively, the
private financial intermediary could work directly with the state, whereby
the state would aggregate all the property tax deferrals and related tax
liens. It would then sell these claims to the private financial intermediary,
which would securitize them and sell the securities. This approach would
require less private-sector involvement, but the state would have to charge
a rate higher than its general obligation borrowing rate to compensate the
financial intermediary for liquidating these claims earlier in the process.
One option might be to have the state’s portion of the program overseen
by the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency (MassHousing).14 This state
agency offers numerous programs to facilitate homeownership, so a property tax deferral program might be a logical addition to its portfolio. The
agency has the ability to issue tax-exempt debt, and it also issues mortgage
debt which it then securitizes. Given its focus and expertise, MassHousing might be able to facilitate the private financing of a state property tax
deferral program.
These two approaches represent different options for how involved a
private company could be in managing the program. In the first instance,
the private financial intermediary could take on the task of providing educational materials for local officials. In the second instance, the company
could work directly with the state or MassHousing to structure and manage
the program. A question of sequencing also arises. The government could
get the program up and running by issuing government debt and then,
if reluctant to increase its indebtedness further, invite a private financial
intermediary to purchase and securitize these claims.
The involvement of the private sector requires a clear trade-off. The costs
to the homeowner would be higher with private-sector involvement, but a
less expensive publicly financed program is of no use to anyone if it is never
enacted.

Effects on Homeowners
Tapping home equity would provide a way for many resource-strapped
seniors to make ends meet or to maintain their pre-retirement standard
of living. In fact, for many households, particularly those with less wealth,
their home equity is larger than their financial assets. They could access
their equity most directly by selling the house and purchasing a smaller, less expensive house for their retirement. Such a shift would not only
produce a cash bundle but also it might reduce the expenses associated
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with homeownership. The problem is that most retirees are attached to
their homes and want to age in place. For retirees who want to stay
put, the only alternative is to borrow against their home. This borrowing
could be done through a state property tax deferral program or a reverse
mortgage.
Property tax deferrals and reverse mortgages are similar in three ways:
(1) they require homeowners to occupy the home as their primary residence;15 (2) they allow older homeowners to tap their home equity while
remaining in their home; and (3) they are repaid when the borrowers sell
the home, no longer occupy it as a primary residence, or die. However, these
approaches also differ along three dimensions: complexity, cost, and access
to funds.

Complexity
Relative to reverse mortgages, property tax deferrals are a simple way to
tap home equity. Essentially all reverse mortgages are government insured
Home Equity Conversion Mortgages (HECMs), available to homeowners
age 62+. The application process is daunting, and borrowers need to meet
many requirements before they can be approved for a reverse mortgage.
They need to:
• certify that at least one of the owners is over age 62;
• own the property free and clear or have paid down a considerable
amount;
• verify their income, assets, monthly living expenses, and credit history;
• have a history of timely payment for real estate taxes and hazard and flood
insurance;
• have no delinquency on any federal debt;
• ensure that the property meets all of the Federal Housing Authority’s
standards and flood requirements; and
• participate in a consumer information session given by a Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD)-approved HECM counselor.
In comparison, homeowners applying for a property tax deferral would only
need to certify that:
• at least one of the owners is over age 65; and
• they owe less than 60 percent of the property’s assessed value in deferred
taxes, accrued interest, and mortgages.
While mandatory counseling sessions would not be required for property tax deferral, a major educational initiative by cities and towns would be
needed to ensure that applicants fully understood that deferring taxes—
in the absence of appreciation in house prices—reduces the amount that
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could be left to their heirs. But property tax deferral—checking a box on
the property tax bill—is an infinitely easier way to access home equity than
taking out a reverse mortgage.

Costs
Two types of costs can be involved in accessing home equity: up-front costs
to gain access to the product and interest costs associated with the loan (to
be repaid, in both cases, when the homeowner moves or dies).
Reverse mortgages have both up-front costs and an interest charge on
funds borrowed. In the case of a $500,000 house, the upfront cost would
total about $19,000—a $6,000 origination fee, a $10,000 insurance premium, and $2,500 in other closing costs.16 In terms of costs of borrowed funds,
the interest rate is set at 2.5 percentage points over London Interbank
Offered Rate (LIBOR), which in January 2020 was 2 percent.17 Another 0.5
percentage point is added to the rate for ongoing insurance costs to bring
the total to 5 percent.
In contrast, borrowing through a property tax deferral program would
involve no up-front costs and most likely a lower interest rate. If, as discussed
above, the government funded the program by issuing longer term TANs
or RANs, the interest rate plus buffer could be as low as 2.5 percent as of
January 2020.18 In short, the costs for a homeowner to tap home equity
would be substantially lower through property tax deferral than taking out
a reverse mortgage.

Access to funds
Access to funds has two dimensions: the amount that can be borrowed
against the house and flexibility in accessing those funds.
In terms of the maximum amount the homeowner can borrow, a comparison between reverse mortgages and property tax deferrals requires some
assumptions. The amount available via a reverse mortgage depends on the
age of the youngest borrower or eligible non-borrowing spouse; the current
interest rate; and the lesser of the appraised value, the HECM Federal Housing Administration (FHA) mortgage limit of $765,000, or the sale price.
Reverse mortgage borrowers can choose equal monthly payments, a line of
credit, a combination of monthly payments and a line of credit, or a single
disbursement lump sum. Typically, HECM loans are set up as a line of credit
(Pinnacle Actuarial Resources 2019). Let us assume for purposes of comparison, however, that homeowners want their money up front. In early 2020,
the 65-year-old owner of a $500,000 house could receive $230,000 through
a reverse mortgage.19 If the owner accessed that money and used the 4
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percent rule of thumb (the withdrawal rate that should allow the homeowner not to exhaust the principal), the $230,000 would provide $9,200 in
additional annual income for as long as the homeowner was alive.20
For the same $500,000 house, property tax deferral would reduce the
average homeowner’s expenses—and thereby increase income available for
items—by $5,000 annually. Thus, the reverse mortgage offers the homeowner the ability to borrow more against home equity than a property tax
deferral program. This relationship holds until the house value exceeds the
FHA limit of $765,000, after which the gap between the two sources narrows a bit as property tax deferral (as proposed) would be applied to the first
$1,000,000 of assessed value. In no case, however, could a property tax deferral program offer a homeowner hundreds of thousands of dollars up front.
On the flexibility side, both approaches offer the homeowner some leeway. One advantage of property tax deferral is that homeowners can choose
to use the program to cover only unusual expenditures, such as a new roof,
or to use it year after year to supplement their other sources of retirement
income—although, as noted above, this option raises some administrative
issues. Reverse mortgages also offer flexibility in that borrowers can (and
do) take their money as a line of credit. Under the HECM program, any
unused balance of the line of credit grows over time at the same interest
rate used for the loan. So, borrowers selecting this option see an increase
over time in the amount available to them. The downside of not borrowing
all the money available through the line of credit is that the homeowner will
have paid substantially more in up-front costs than necessary.
The bottom line from the perspective of the householder is that the property tax is far less complicated and less costly than a reverse mortgage, but
for most homeowners the reverse mortgage offers the opportunity to access
more home equity. Of course, accessing more home equity is not costless;
the more that must be repaid with interest at moving or death, the less is
left for homeowners or their heirs.

Conclusion
Many retirees will have insufficient money from conventional retirement
programs to maintain their standards of living when they stop working. To
help support themselves, they will need to tap into their home equity, which
is the major asset for most middle-income households. But tapping home
equity is difficult. Most people are reluctant to downsize and, even when
they do, they rarely reduce their housing expenses. Reverse mortgages are
an option, but most households are put off by the enormity of the decision,
the complexity of the product, and the high up-front costs.
A state-wide property tax deferral program overcomes the hurdles to
accessing home equity. Property tax deferral does not provide access to as
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much home equity as a reverse mortgage, but the offsetting advantage is
that some of the house value after the repayment of the loan and interest
will be available for a bequest.
At the household level, the proposed program is revenue neutral: all taxes owed by a participating household are paid back, with interest sufficient
to cover the cost of borrowing and to cover administrative expenses. Nevertheless, because loans are made well in advance of repayments, the sponsor
of the plan must cover start-up costs. If the state government simply borrowed money to cover the annual outlays, Massachusetts’ ratio of debt to
GSP would rise from 14 percent to 15.1 percent. The alternative is to involve
the private sector. This decision would raise the costs to homeowners, but
nevertheless may be a necessary step to get a broad-based program up and
running.

Appendix A
Outline of Proposed Massachusetts Property
Tax Deferral Program

Individuals age 65 or older who have owned a home in MA and occupied it as their
principal residence for at least five years would be eligible to defer their property
taxes.
The state’s new property tax deferral program procedure would work as follows:
(1) The first-quarter property tax bill for all cities and towns will include a checkbox where homeowners certify their eligibility for the program and indicate
their desire to participate on an annual basis.
(2) Under Chapter 60 Section 37 of the Massachusetts General Laws, unpaid
municipal property taxes are automatically secured by a lien on the home. The
city or town would continue to retain the lien for deferred taxes and interest;
and this lien would still be prior to other liens, such as mortgages.21
(3) For those choosing to participate, the city or town will forward a copy of the
property tax bill to the Massachusetts Department of Revenue.
(4) The Massachusetts Department of Revenue will send the town an amount
equal to the deferred taxes.
(5) The legislation would provide that the state will be repaid the principal plus
interest when the homeowner sells the home or dies. In the case of property
owned jointly, the state will be repaid when the surviving owner sells or dies.
The deferral amount can also be repaid earlier at the homeowner’s discretion.
(6) The homeowner can defer property taxes until the sum of deferrals, accumulated interest, and mortgages reaches 60 percent of the first million dollars of
assessed value.
(7) The interest rate each year will be set at the state’s borrowing cost plus a buffer
of 50 basis points to cover administrative costs and defaults.
(8) The state will borrow the funds each year to transfer an amount equal to the
deferred taxes for that year to the city or town.
(9) Once notified that the home has been sold, the city or town will collect the
deferred taxes plus interest and remit this amount to the state.
(10) The deferred taxes and interest would be due within one year, after which the
interest rate penalty would begin.

Appendix B
Sample property tax bill

Appendix C
Effect of Property Tax Deferral Program on
Homeowners in Massachusetts

On average, homeowners age 65+ in Massachusetts will be able to defer about $5,000
per year in tax expenditures through the proposed program. This average deferral
amount varies by county, from a low of $3,614 in Bristol County to a high of $5,963
in Middlesex County.

Table C1. Average property value and tax for households age 65+, 2017
County

Property value ($)

Property tax ($)

Median income
(before taxes) ($)

State-wide
average
Barnstable
Berkshire
Bristol
Dukes
Essex
Franklin
Hampden
Hampshire
Middlesex
Nantucket
Norfolk
Plymouth
Suffolk
Worcester

475,754

4,745

63,050

562,732
326,970
332,937
652,153
469,248
315,913
240,417
294,059
654,093
652,153
590,009
404,798
702,768
357,330

4,068
3,378
3,614
3,525
5,138
4,707
3,862
4,325
5,963
3,525
5,644
4,539
3,898
4,847

62,460
45,500
58,000
58,000
67,070
69,700
53,700
66,200
71,090
58,000
74,200
62,100
71,900
59,250

Note: American Community Survey (ACS) Public Use Microdata Sample (PUMS) is used to
calculate county-level statistics; PUMS is a subsample of the full ACS (IPUMS) sample.
Source: US Census Bureau, American Community Survey (2018).

Appendix D
Modeling assumptions and sources for
state-wide Massachusetts deferral program
Table D1. Modeling assumptions and sources for statewide Massachusetts deferral
program
Variable
Economic Variables
Housing price
appreciation
State ACS borrowing cost
Demographic Variables
Homeowners age 65+ in
Massachusetts
Average Massachusetts
home value
Average Massachusetts
property tax rate
Mortality
Population growth

Program Variables
Borrowing cap
Interest charged to
household
When deferral and interest paid back for married
households
Participation rate
Phase-in period for the
program

Assumption

Sources

0.5 percent real

All-Transactions House Price Index
for the United States (1980–2018).

1.2 percent real

a

506,332

US Census Bureau (2018)
American Community Survey
US Census Bureau (2018)
American Community Survey
US Census Bureau (2018)
American Community Survey
SSA Period Life Table 2019)

$475,754
1 percent
Age-based period life
table
Based on UMass (2019–
2035); and SSA (2035–
2100).

University of Massachusetts Donahue Institute (2015); 2019 SS
Trustees Report

60 percent of home value
assuming no mortgage
State borrowing cost
+50 basis points for
administration
When last member of a
couple dies

Program assumption

20 percent
5 years

NRRIb
Program assumption

Program assumption

Assumption for estimate

Notes: a Massachusetts assumed borrowing rate is based on a 10-year general obligation bond
rate, which historically tracks closely to the 10-year treasury bond rate. The 10-year treasury
yield over the past two decades averaged 1.2 percent in real terms. Financial institutions such
as J. P. Morgan use the same long-run projection for 10-year treasury bonds. See Electronic
Municipal Market Access (2005-2019) and J. P. Morgan (2019).
b
Share of NRRI homeowning households ages 55–59 who are at risk of being unable to maintain pre-retirement standard of living with no bequest motive plus half of at risk households
with a moderate bequest motive
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Notes
1. For details on the NRRI methodology, see Munnell et al. (2018).
2. For detailed information on each state’s program, see Lincoln Institute of Land
Policy (2019).
3. In addition, qualified senior homeowners can work off up to $1,500 on their property tax bill by volunteering for their city or town. The city or town administers the
program, keeping track of hours worked, and credits for each hour worked an
amount not to exceed the minimum wage ($12.75). Each city or town can change
the income limits and benefit amounts up to the maximum. The tax work-off
credit cannot exceed the total tax due after any other exemptions. An approved
representative may do the volunteer work for people physically unable to provide
such services. See Massachusetts Acts of 2016 (2016).
4. Renters are also eligible for the Circuit Breaker Credit, if one-quarter of their
annual rent exceeds 10 percent of their income.
5. In Massachusetts, localities may petition the state for permission to set the income
limit even higher than the Circuit Breaker limit for single head of households.
For instance, Newton set their income requirement at $86,000, well above the
$60,000 Circuit Breaker limit.
6. Any mortgage lender must agree that the locality’s interest in the property would
take priority over all other interests (Massachusetts Acts of 2016).
7. After six months, the treasurer may petition to foreclose the lien on the property.
8. The legislation enacting the deferral program will need to provide that the lien
continues during the deferral period. Under existing law, the lien disappears if
foreclosure proceedings are not commenced within a specific period after the
tax is due.
9. The ability to turn the deferral on and off would have to be carefully delineated.
At a minimum, the election should properly be done on an annual—as opposed
to quarterly—basis. In addition, for the homeowner who defers in 2020, but pays
full taxes in 2021, does the 2021 payment go to pay off the 2020 deferral or to
cover the current year only? A simpler, but less flexible, approach would have the
election carry forward unless the homeowner revokes the deferral and repays the
deferral in full.
10. For example, a 1998 AARP report found that just 20 percent of people who were
eligible for property tax relief programs knew they existed. But even of those who
knew of the programs, just 1.4 percent participated.
11. This estimate was derived using Oregon Legislative Revenue Office (2001); Oregon Department of Revenue (2009); and authors’ calculations from US Census
Bureau, American Community Survey (1960−2008).
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12. Almost 60 percent of Massachusetts homeowners age 65+ own their home free
and clear (US Census Bureau, American Community Survey, 2018).
13. The projection assumes a population growth pattern that follows the University of Massachusetts Donahue Institute (2015) for the short term and the SSA
Trustees Report (2019) for the long term; a home appreciation rate of 0.5 percent in real terms; a 1.2 percent state borrowing rate in real terms; a 14 percent
debt to GSP ratio (a stable ratio from 2011 to 2018) in the absence of the program, and a 2.1 percent growth rate for GSP. See Appendix D for details on model
assumptions.
14. For information on the agency’s role in encouraging homeownership, see Massachusetts Department of Housing (2020).
15. Ensuring that the property is owner-occupied raises an administrative issue for
property tax deferral programs. Even though prohibited, a 65-year-old could
defer property taxes and then rent out the home. Cities and towns do not
currently provide any oversight in this area. On the other hand, MassHousing
does have this obligation for some of its programs, which offers another reason
for considering embedding the program within the agency.
16. In this example, the origination fee used is the maximum allowed (the greater
of $2,500 or 2% of the first $200,000 of the home’s value plus 1% of the
amount over $200,000); the insurance premium is calculated as 2 percent of
the home value for all borrowers (based on data since late 2017); and the
estimate for other closing costs (which include appraisal and legal fees) relies
on the calculator from the National Reverse Mortgage Lenders Association
(NRMLA 2020).
17. The interest rate in this example is an adjustable rate, like most reverse mortgage
loans taken out by homeowners. The lender’s margin of 2.5 percent comes from
NRMLA. For historical statistics, such as adjustable rates and fixed rates on all
HECM originations, see the monthly publications by HUD. Interest rates may
have declined as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, but this chapter relies on
rates from a less atypical period.
18. The estimate used here reflects the most recent data available. Given the COVID19 pandemic, the rate may have declined since January 2020.
19. HECM principal limit factors (PLFs) provide the percentage of the maximum
claim amount (MCA) allowable in total cash draws, given the age of the borrower(s) and the ‘expected’ interest rate of the loan. Based on the HECM PLF
tables (effective October 2, 2017), the factor for a homeowner at age 65 with the
assumed interest rate (one-year LIBOR rate plus lender’s margin only) is 0.459,
which yields $230,000 for a $500,000 house.
20. Regarding the 4 percent rule, some investment experts have suggested it is outdated and that individuals would be safer using a lower withdrawal given the
prolonged environment of low returns on fixed-income portfolios. Alternatively,
if instead of using any such rule of thumb the homeowner purchased an annuity, the annual income would be greater—$14,450 for a single life and $12,200
if the homeowner selected a joint and survivor product. But few people actually purchase annuities. The annuity amount is calculated using market quotes as
of January 22, 2020, from WebAnnuities Insurance Agency, Inc. for a 65-year-old
male in Massachusetts.
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21. The legislation enacting the deferral program will need to provide that the lien
continues during the deferral period. Under existing law, the lien disappears if
foreclosure proceedings are not commenced within a specific period after the
tax is due.
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